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Abstract 
 
Engaging democratically elected assemblies in national decision-making over the 
extraterritorial use of force seemingly provides a secure check on executive abuses of power. 
Many liberal democracies therefore maintain constitutional requirements that their elected 
national assembly must authorise decisions to use military force. By comparison, the UK 
Parliament has historically played a limited and often indirect role in authorising the use of 
force. From the vote on the Iraq War in 2003 onwards, however, the UK Parliament’s role 
has increased to the point where, in August 2013, the defeat of a Government motion seeking 
approval for the use of force undermined efforts to build an international coalition to 
intervene in the on-going Syrian conflict. Whilst debate regarding this shift has hitherto 
concentrated on the degree to which parliamentary oversight of the war prerogative is 
desirable, in this article we consider what Parliament’s evolving role heralds for the general 
relationship between domestic and UN mechanisms. We challenge the underlying assumption 
that Parliament’s interventions mark an indisputably positive development in constraining the 
use of force. When coupled with the focus upon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
which has accompanied many controversial exercises of UK military force since the end of 
the Cold War, the involvement of Parliament in the decision-making process risks hollowing 
out UN Charter safeguards. Arguably, successive UK Governments have acquiesced to the 
extension of Parliament’s role in an effort to shift the locus for legitimating uses of force 
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away from UN institutions, where the UK cannot control the actions of other states, and 
towards domestic processes which are more susceptible to the Government’s influence. 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the more striking features of the ongoing crises in Libya, Syria and Iraq, is that the 
resultant use-of-force debates have not been confined to foreign ministries or the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), but have spilled over into many domestic assemblies. 
Executive-led justifications of proposed uses of force based upon accounts of national interest 
and international law might have triggered these debates, but they have been shaped by the 
legacy of the “new-world-order” humanitarian interventions of the 1990s and the post-9/11 
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Our article evaluates whether this turn towards, and even 
extension of, domestic use-of-force arrangements is aimed at circumventing inconvenient UN 
mechanisms. Orthodox accounts of international law have long treated the legitimacy of 
domestic constitutional arrangements for authorising force as irrelevant to the question of 
whether military action is legal.
1
 Thus, when the United States (US) has characterised uses of 
force as “police actions”2 or when President Barack Obama invoked the 2001 Authorization 
for the Use of Military Force to intervene in Syria and Iraq in 2014,
3
 these evasions of the US 
Constitution’s requirement of congressional approval of military action4 have generally been 
thought not to affect these actions’ compliance with international law.5 In this article we treat 
the United Kingdom (UK) as our primary case study of state efforts to use domestic 
authorisation to side-step the Charter’s strictures. The UK’s permanent UNSC membership, 
its shifting domestic use-of-force arrangements and its invocation of novel legal bases for 
action combine to make its state practice worthy of particular study.
 
In the course of House of Commons debates over the UK’s involvement in airstrikes 
in Libya, Syria and Iraq since 2011, the Government’s legal justifications for action have 
included humanitarian intervention
6
 and collective and individual security
7
 in addition to 
                                                 
1
 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), 
Judgment [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para.263. See also J. d’Aspremont, ‘Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of 
Democracy’ (2006) 38 NYUJ Intl L & Pol 877, 878-879. 
2
 See T. Franck & F. Patel, ‘UN Police Action in Lieu of War: “The Old Order Changeth”’ (1991) 85 AJIL 63. 
3
 Authorization for Use of Military Force 2001, Pub.L. 107-40. 
4
 US Constitution, Art.I., s.8(11). 
5
 See S.K. Murray, ‘The Contemporary Presidency: Stretching the 2001 AUMF: A History of Two Presidencies’ 
(2015) 45 PSQ 175, 192-194. 
6
 See, for different perspectives on the doctrine, S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian 
Intervention and International Law (OUP, 2001), A. Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human 
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UNSC resolutions. These justifications complicate the question of whether a use of force 
complies with international law and can serve to cloak proposed military actions in 
superficially-impressive legalese. Such complication, however, has served the UK 
Government efforts to marginalise the significance of international institutions in use-of-force 
decisions and to enhance Parliament’s role in the authorisation process. Historically, UK 
legislators played little role in authorising uses of force. As one judge put it bluntly in the 
1960s, ‘[a] schoolboy’s knowledge of history is ample to disclose some of the disasters which 
have been due to parliamentary … attempts at control’.8 Notwithstanding the dawn of 
democratic governance Parliament remained side-lined by executive dominance of the war 
prerogative throughout the twentieth-century. When the UN Charter invested the UNSC with 
the responsibility for authorising responses to threats to international peace and security, 
Parliament appeared further marginalised. In the twenty-first century, however, a 
constitutional convention has rapidly emerged by which the House of Commons’ agreement 
is ordinarily necessary to authorise military action.
9
  
The orthodox explanation of this development is that, amidst the on-going fallout 
from the 2003 Iraq War, ministers have been obliged to gain Parliament’s assent to 
demonstrate their commitment to thorough oversight of the use of force.
10
 This development 
has been cast in positive light, as bringing ‘necessary democratic balance’ to use-of-force 
decisions
11
 and providing an additional check against abuses of power.
12
 We maintain, 
however, that Parliament’s developing role poses serious risks. MPs have become a key 
audience for Government efforts to vest extraordinary legal significance in UK state practice. 
Unlike, other states where legislature approval for use of force is ordinarily predicated upon 
separate UNSC authorisation,
13
 the parliamentary process is not explicitly envisaged as 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rights and the Use of Force in International Law (CUP, 2003), and J. Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and 
the Responsibility To Protect: Who Should Intervene? (OUP, 2010). 
7
 See C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3
rd
 Ed., OUP, 2008) 209-226. 
8
 Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75, 100 (Lord Reid). 
9
 See J. Strong, ‘Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative 
through Syria, Libya and Iraq’ (2015) 17 BJPIR 604, 605. 
10
 ibid., 606. 
11
 N.D. White, ‘Libya and Lessons from Iraq: International Law and the Use of Force by the United Kingdom’ 
(2011) 42 NYIL 215, 225. See also A. McHarg, ‘Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law, 
Convention, Soft Law’ (2008) 71 MLR 853, 866-867. 
12
 See S. Dieterich, H. Hummel & S. Marschall, ‘Bringing Democracy Back In: The Democratic Peace, 
Parliamentary War Powers and European Participation in the 2003 Iraq War’ (2015) 50 C&C 87 and D. Peters 
& W. Wagner, ‘Between Military Efficiency and Democratic Legitimacy: Mapping Parliamentary War Powers 
in Contemporary Democracies, 1989-2004’ (2011) 64 PA 175. 
13
 European Council, ‘Seville Declarations on the Treaty of Nice’ (21 Jun 2002). See also the Irish Department 
of Foreign Affairs on Ireland’s ‘Triple-Lock’ system securing its neutrality, available at: 
http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=26263. 
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supplementing the Charter’s requirements. The newfound ministerial willingness to submit 
use-of-force decisions to Parliament may well mark an effort to supplant, rather than 
supplement, international mechanisms for legitimating the use of force.
14
  
 We open our account with an explanation of the multiple conceptions of legitimacy in 
the context of the use of force and how governments can manipulate this indeterminacy to 
generate a basis for military action. We then trace the development of two trends in UK use-
of-force decision making. We designate the first trend as the external dimension, because it 
deals with the UK Government’s interpretation of when military action is in accordance with 
international law. Rather than exhaustively recounting the controversial recent history of 
humanitarian intervention or anticipatory self-defence we specifically address how the UK 
Government has sought, through its characterisation of state practice, to bring about changes 
to international law. Parliament’s expanding role in use-of-force decisions provides the 
internal dimension of the UK’s changing practice. We examine how the UK Government has 
combined parliamentary authorisation with novel legal bases for action to facilitate the use of 
military force. In his efforts to persuade Parliament to authorise interventions in Libya in 
2011, Syria in 2013, Iraq in 2014, and again in Syria in 2015, David Cameron has repeatedly 
sought to relegate international institutions to the margins. This approach potentially gives 
free rein to unilateralist and hegemonic exercises of military power yet many 
parliamentarians have maintained the need for engagement with international mechanisms to 
legitimate the use of force.  
 
Legality and Legitimacy in the Use of Force  
 
Given humanitarian intervention’s scant grounding in international law15 commentators have 
exposed how, during NATO’s 1999 Kosovo intervention, participating states began to cast 
the doctrine as legitimate, rather than legal. The shift in language was not subtle. At the 
height of NATO’s airstrikes Tony Blair declared that this was ‘a just war, based not on any 
territorial ambitions but on values’.16 A month later the UK Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, 
dismissed questions over the legality of using force as a distraction from ‘the evil that we are 
                                                 
14
 As such, humanitarian intervention could amount to little more than an ‘antiseptic version of imperialism’; 
B.R. Barber, ‘Constitutional Faith’ in M.C. Nussbaum (ed), For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of 
Patriotism (Beacon Press, 1996) 30, 33.  
15
 S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (OUP, 2001) 231. 
16
 A. Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ (Speech delivered at Chicago, 24 April 1999). Available 
at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297. 
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fighting’.17 Bruno Simma came perilously close to endorsing such claims by asserting that the 
Kosovo intervention could ‘with all due caution ... be regarded as legitimately, if not legally, 
following the direction of ... UN decisions’.18 This shift was not a mere linguistic trope. 
Whereas the legality of a use of force is dependent upon compliance with rules of 
international law the legitimacy of such an action is arguably the product of a combination of 
legal, political and moral considerations which do not necessarily align.
19
 The balance 
between these factors can shift depending upon whether a government is seeking to persuade 
international institutions or a domestic audience that a proposed military action is legitimate. 
The concept of legitimacy can therefore be grounded in ‘particular values and on unilateral or 
partial appreciations’ of an action,20 providing a level of indeterminacy which can be 
exploited when militarily powerful countries seek to evade international law’s restrictions 
upon military force. 
Nonetheless, Anthea Roberts suggests that a binary account of the relationship 
between legality and legitimacy is unhelpful; ‘one of the functions of law is to help delimit 
legitimate actions from illegitimate actions and thus help guide behaviour’.21 When we speak 
of “legalised” legitimacy, derived in part from a rules-based assessment of the validity of 
actions, political legitimacy, derived from the democratic accountability of the actors 
involved in a decision, and moral legitimacy, derived from the values-based arguments for 
intervention (such as the desirability of assisting allies or alleviating a humanitarian crisis), 
these facets of “rightful” international conduct are not demarked by fixed boundaries.22 Even 
in the context of the Kosovo intervention, the Blair Government might have wrapped the 
UK’s involvement in the rhetoric of legitimacy, but it also advanced response to a 
humanitarian catastrophe as a legal basis for action.
23
 The subsequent machinations 
surrounding UNSC Resolution 1441
24
 as a legal basis for the Iraq War in 2003,
25
 show the 
                                                 
17
 HC Deb, vol.331, col.890 (18 May 1999). See also col.886. 
18
 B. Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 EJIL 1, 12. For echoes of this 
position see the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International 
Response, Lessons Learned (2000) 164 and T. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and 
Armed Attacks (CUP, 2002) 175-184. 
19
 See C. Thomas, ‘The Use and Abuses of Legitimacy within International Law’ (2014) 34 OJLS 729, 733. 
20
 J. Crawford, ‘The Problems of Legitimacy-Speak’ (2004) 98 ASILC 271, 272. 
21
 A. Roberts, ‘Legality vs Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force Be Illegal but Justified?’ in P. Alston & E. 
MacDonald (eds), Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force (OUP, 2008) 179, 207. 
22
 See J-M. Coicaud, ‘Deconstructing International Legitimacy’ in H. Charlesworth & J-M. Coicaud (eds), Fault 
Lines of International Legitimacy (CUP, 2010) 29, 56-67. 
23
 See I. Brownlie, ‘Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memoranda on the International Law Aspects’ (2000) 49 ICLQ 878. 
Michael Glennon exposes the tensions within the UK Foreign Office and between the UK and US on a legal 
basis for the Kosovo intervention; M. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Intervention after Kosovo 
(2001) 178. 
24
 UNSC Res. 1441 (8 Nov 2002) UN Doc. S/RES/1441. 
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continuing importance of building a legal (and not simply political or moral) case for UK 
military action.  
When the UK has sought to use force outwith a clear basis under the Charter these 
examples indicate that the Government has placed a premium on constructing plausible 
“legalised” grounds for action. Inconvenient international law strictures needed to be 
weakened as a corollary of these efforts. Throughout his time in office Tony Blair maintained 
that a ‘reconsideration’26 of the UNSC’s role was necessary and warned that he could not 
contemplate the escalation of perceived  threats to peace and security when ‘the UN – 
because of a political disagreement in its Councils – is paralysed’.27 International law, as it so 
the case within the UK’s dualist legal order, was presented as more malleable than domestic 
law, no matter how firmly established the specific rules on the use of force.
28
 This 
combination of questioning the UNSC’s role and positing alternate bases for the use of force 
was not intended to substitute legitimacy for legality, but to give an action enough of a 
flavour of international legality to generate a base of support amongst domestic actors. UK 
Government circles internalised the lesson from these events that a case for military action 
couched in legalised language and approved by authoritative figures like the Attorney 
General could make an action appear sufficiently legitimate to neutralise some domestic 
opposition. 
The shift towards a legalised, as opposed to legal basis for war, is not simply some 
rhetorical ruse, it signals a deeper transformation in the use-of-force discourse. Legalised 
arguments and political and moral legitimacy claims provide a mutually-reinforcing cycle. In 
the context of our UK case study this discourse can be seen at work in the recent UK 
Parliamentary debates over intervention in the Middle East and the Maghreb. The summary 
of the Attorney General’s advice published prior to the 2013 Syria-intervention debate parsed 
the relevant international law. It focused upon intervention’s potential for ‘deterring and 
disrupting’29 the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, but referred to the absence of 
a UNSC mandate only obliquely, in stating that the ‘UK is seeking a resolution … which 
                                                                                                                                                        
25
 See G. Simpson, ‘The War in Iraq and International Law’ (2005) 6 MelbJlIntLaw 167. 
26
 A. Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ (Speech delivered at Chicago, 24 April 1999). Available 
at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297. 
27
 A. Blair, ‘The Threat of Global Terrorism’ (Speech delivered at Sedgefield, 5 Mar 2004). Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/mar/05/iraq.iraq.  
28
 See T. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP, 1990) 4-8. 
29
 See D. Grieve, ‘Guidance: Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government Legal Position’ (29 
Aug 2013) para.2. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235098/Chemical-weapon-use-
by-Syrian-regime-UK-government-legal-position.pdf.  
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would … authorise member states … to take all necessary measures to protect civilians in 
Syria’.30 Little over a year later David Cameron insisted that a military response to the rise of 
Islamic State (ISIS) in both Iraq and Syria would be legal on the basis of self-defence 
concerns,
31
 generated by the return of UK-resident ISIS fighters, and the need to protect 
refugees and minority communities.
32
 In the event, only a deployment in Iraq, which had 
requested assistance, was subject to a vote, but through such claims the Government was 
attempting to establish a legalised basis for a more extensive action should the issue be 
revisited. Although UNSC inaction has overshadowed many of these parliamentary debates, 
even when it has acted, as in the case of Resolution 2249 (albeit not under Chapter VII) on 
the threat to international peace and security posed by ISIS,
33
 the UK Government has 
maintained its freedom of action with regard to this precedent by declaring that this 
‘resolution is not necessary … to justify action’.34 By contrast, with regard to action against 
ISIS in Syria, the Prime Minister has characterised the Commons’ support for UK action as 
being so significant that he would not hold a vote ‘if there is a danger of losing it’.35 These 
examples showcase the UK Government attempting to generate legitimacy for an action 
through superficially plausible, even if far from orthodox, legal explanations of the use of 
force. If the Commons accepts these claims, and authorises such an action, a necessary 
degree of domestic political legitimacy will attach to an action.  
When Parliament is swayed by legalised language, it generates a precedent which 
makes support for future actions easier to secure. As with executive practice, domestic 
assemblies can contribute to the state-practice basis for customary international law.
36
 In 
theory, therefore, a legislature’s acceptance of non-Charter-based justifications for military 
force could contribute to the legality of such an action. When a legislature has been 
democratically-elected, its authorisation of a use of force poses a challenge to the basis of 
international institutions’ authority.37 As such, “democratic” authorisation can be used to 
silence or marginalise ‘“peace through law” enthusiasts’.38 In the post-9/11 era, the Bush 
                                                 
30
 ibid., para.3. 
31
 Charter of the United Nations (24 Oct 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 51. 
32
 HC Deb, vol.585, col.1255 (26 Sep 2014).  
33
 UNSC Res. 2249 (20 Nov 2015) UN Doc. S/RES/2249. 
34
 J. Wright, HC Deb, vol.602, col.1468 (26 Nov 2015). 
35
 HC Deb, vol.602, col.1505 (26 Nov 2015). 
36
 See M. Wood (ILC Special Rapporteur), ‘Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law’ 
(2014) UN Doc A/CN.4/672, para.41. Available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_672.pdf. 
37
 See A. Slaughter & W. Burke-White, ‘The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, the European Way of 
Law)’ (2006) 47 Harv Intl LJ 327 and B.R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (OUP, 2000). 
38
 M. Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15 
EJIL 907, 911. 
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Administration used such reasoning to deny the authority of international institutions.
39
 The 
converse of this process is readily identifiable; international institutional activity regularly 
impacts upon the domestic legitimacy of conflict decisions. Resolution 1973 authorising the 
2011 intervention in Libya
40
 played an important role in legitimating the US engagement 
even in the absence of specific congressional approval for the deployment.
41
 In the UK, 
David Cameron similarly harnessed ‘the legitimising power of the Security Council to win ... 
parliamentary support’.42 In contrast to democratically-elected domestic assemblies, UN 
mechanisms are susceptible to critique on the basis of their so-called democratic deficit.
43
 
Claims that domestic assembly authorisation can enhance the international legal legitimacy of 
an intervention are therefore difficult for the UNSC to resist, but create obvious dangers.  
 
The External Dimension: Sidestepping the UNSC 
 
The panoply of legal arguments advanced by states regarding the use of force during and 
since the 2011 intervention in Libya evidences their eagerness to develop novel, and non-
Charter-based, legal avenues for military action. The UK’s invocation of humanitarian 
intervention and self defence illustrates this shift, and in this section we examine the UK’s 
changing approach to these doctrines. For our purposes self defence covers any effort to 
justify an action under Article 51 of the Charter, which permits states to use force without 
Chapter VII authorisation.
44
 Humanitarian intervention is understood as the military 
involvement of one or more states in another state without its consent or UN authorisation for 
avowedly altruistic purposes, such as protecting civilians from serious human rights abuses 
by the state or by forces which the state is unable or unwilling to control.
45
 This formula 
adopt a state-centric approach to the global legal order.
46
  
                                                 
39
 See R. Kagan, ‘America’s Crisis of Legitimacy’ (2004) 83 FA 65, 67. 
40
 UNSC Res. 1973, ‘Libya’ (17 Mar 2011) UN Doc. S/RES/1973. 
41
 J. Galbraith, ‘International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers’ (2013) 99 VaLRev 987, 998-999. 
42
 J. Strong, ‘Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative 
through Syria, Libya and Iraq’ (2015) 17 BJPIR 604, 615. 
43
 See S. Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (Hart, 2010) 50-59 and J. Crawford & S. 
Marks, ‘The Global Democracy Deficit: An Essay in International Law and its Limits’, in D. Archibugi, D. Held 
& M. Köhler (eds), Re-imagining political community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Stanford UP, 
1998) 72.  
44
 Charter of the United Nations (24 Oct 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 51. 
45
 See R. Higgins, ‘Intervention and International Law’, in H. Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics (OUP, 
1988) 31. See also A. Roberts, ‘The So-Called “Right” of Humanitarian Intervention’ (2000) 3 YIHL 3, 5. 
46
 See A. Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law 
(CUP, 2003) 56-70 and S. Robertson, ‘Beseeching Dominance: Critical Thoughts on the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine’ (2005) 12 Aust ILJ 33. 
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States have long invoked humanitarian grounds for intervention even when other 
means of addressing a situation remained open. The pre-Charter era saw numerous 
supposedly-altruistic interventions.
47
 Pre-Charter debates over interventions were often 
internal to the intervening powers, especially when the interests of other powerful states were 
not in question. The value of these interventions as precedents for action did not survive the 
Charter, which constrains the use of force using Westphalian conceptions of state 
sovereignty
48
 and by the power-relations between the UNSC’s five permanent members.49 A 
direct reading of the Charter’s terms, reinforced by the 1970 UN General Assembly 
Declaration on Friendly Relations,
50
 treats recourse to force as legal if undertaken in self-
defence, collective or individual, or under the auspices of Chapter VII resolutions. Outside 
these confines use of force by states is prima facie illegal, although episodes such as “Uniting 
for Peace” indicate the possibility of alternate bases for UN-authorised action.51  
The UK’s impatience with the confines of the Charter has a dark history stretching 
back to the Suez Crisis.
52
 Prime Minister Anthony Eden declared that no UK Government 
could ever be expected to give Parliament an absolute ‘pledge or guarantee’ that the UK 
would only use force under a UNSC mandate.
53
 As the Leader of the Opposition responded, 
the operative question was rather whether the use of force was authorised by the Charter, 
given that Article 51 permitted action in self-defence without UNSC approval.
54
 Threatening 
resignation if the Government continued to present the Suez intervention as abiding by 
international law, the Law Officers maintained that it was ‘difficult if not impossible to find 
any legal justification for our actions’.55 Charlotte Peevers argues that the Suez debacle not 
only ended Eden’s premiership, but also his approach to the UN within UK policy making.56 
                                                 
47
 See E.C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law (John Byrne, 1921) 51-62 and J. MacMillan, 
‘Historicising Intervention: Strategy and Synchronicity in British Intervention 1815-50’ (2013) 39 Rev Intl Stud 
1091. 
48
 Charter of the United Nations (24 Oct 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 2.4. 
49
 See S. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton UP, 1999) 14-20. 
50
 UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV), ‘Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States’ (24 Oct 1970) UN Doc. A/8028. 
51
 UNGA Res. 377 (V), ‘Uniting for Peace’ (30 Nov 1950) UN Doc. A/1775. See A. Carswell, ‘Unblocking the 
UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution’ (2013) 18 JCSL 453, 456-459. 
52
 See, in the context of the Suez Crisis, G. Marston, ‘Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: Legal 
Advice Tendered to the British Government’ (1988) 37 ICLQ 773. 
53
 HC Deb, vol.558, col.307 (13 Sep 1956). 
54
 H. Gaitskell, Letter to the Editor, The Times (15 Sep 1956). 
55
 UK National Archives, PREM 11/1129, Letter from R. Manningham-Buller (Attorney General) to R.A. Butler 
(Home Secretary) (28 Nov 1956). 
56
 Suez might not be quite as clear-cut a turning point as Peevers suggests. Archive materials show that, into the 
1960s legal advisors were still working to persuade Ministry of Defence officials that, outside of Article 51’s 
self-defence provisions, a conflict which is not authorised by a UNSC resolution would breach international law. 
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If Eden had regarded the UN as a mechanism for Great Power management of global 
affairs,
57
 his legal advisers and domestic public opinion instead regarded the Charter as 
‘embedding peace through law’.58 UN mechanisms would, at least for a time, become central 
to UK policy on the use of force,
59
 with its position as a permanent UNSC member being 
used to restrict recourse to force by its Cold War rivals.
60
 Official discussions over the 1970 
Declaration on Friendly Relations, for example, regarded the Charter as a basis for 
denouncing the Brezhnev Doctrine interventions between Warsaw Pact states.
61
  
All of the Permanent Five have wielded their UNSC veto to deny the existence of 
threats to international peace and security or to prevent intervention in response to such 
threats.
62
 Nonetheless, since the Cold War such activity has generated increasing frustration 
with the UNSC system.
63
 It has incentivised efforts to find alternate legal bases for action, 
even if the UK Law Officers had denied their existence during Suez. The Charter’s 
recognition of self-defence as a basis for the use of force outwith UNSC authorisation has 
provided one avenue for action, and state practice under this ground has become increasingly 
controversial. The invocation by several Attorneys General of the Caroline Case
64
 places the 
UK within the imminent-attack school, by which a state does not have to wait for an armed 
attack to occur, but can strike first when such an attack is clearly anticipated and immediate.
65
 
Lord Goldsmith’s advice regarding the 2003 Iraq War positions the UK as accepting a right 
to anticipatory self-defence but also distanced the UK from the pre-emptive “Bush Doctrine” 
which permits a response to a threat which is more remote in time and location.
66
 The US’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
UK National Archives, DEFE 7/2001, Letter from B.B. Hall (Treasury Solicitor’s Department) to P.D. Martyn 
(Ministry of Defence) (15 Aug 1962) 1-2. 
57
 ‘[U]nless the great Powers in the modern world are going to agree and play their part in the world 
organisation, that organisation cannot function properly’; A. Eden, HC Deb, vol.413 col.677 (22 Aug 1945). 
58
 C. Peevers, The Politics of Justifying Force: The Suez Crisis, the Iraq War and International Law (OUP, 
2013) 90. 
59
 ibid., 214-215. 
60
 See R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (OUP, 1994) 262 and W.M. 
Reisman, ‘Unilateral Actions and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem 
of Humanitarian Intervention’ (2000) 11 EJIL 3, 12. 
61
 UK National Archives, FCO 28/920, Letter from C.L.G. Mallaby (FCO Eastern European & Soviet 
Department) to R. Braithwaite (FCO Western Organisations Department) (2 Jun 1970) para.2. 
62
 See A. Roberts, ‘Legality vs Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force Be Illegal but Justified?’ in P. Alston & E. 
MacDonald (eds), Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force (OUP, 2008) 179, 186. 
63
 See M. Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15 
EJIL 907, 911. 
64
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employment of the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine has also been controversial. Although most 
commentators argue that it has yet to become part of customary international law,
67
 in 2015 
Australia and Canada utilised it within the context of their claims to be acting against ISIS in 
Syria under self defence.
68
 The most significant change to self-defence has come about since 
2001 with the potential for non-state actors to fall within Article 51. Previously it was 
accepted that only state-based armed attacks qualified. This has arguably been extended to 
include non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, albeit such a change to customary 
international law remains contested.
69
 In the background of these claims is the need to 
conform to the Charter, demonstrated by states notifying the UNSC of a use of self-defence 
and by the UNSC’s capacity to affirm the existence of a threat to international peace and 
security to which a response is required. Such factual determinations by the UNSC are 
becoming increasing significant when states seek to take action against terrorist threats.  
That the Charter does not expressly prohibit humanitarian intervention and in certain 
circumstances such action might address some of the Charter’s underlying objects and 
purposes, are the tenuous grounds often relied upon by that doctrine’s proponents.70 Although 
articles of the Charter have been re-interpreted in light of customary international law,
71
 a 
state’s ability to control its internal and external affairs, or to consent to ceding control, 
remains paramount.
72
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) moreover maintained, in the 
                                                 
67
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68
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Doc. S/2015/221, Letter dated 9 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United 
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‘Defending Weak States against the “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine’ (2013) 9 Journal of International Law and 
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69
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[2005] ICJ Rep 168 and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory [2004] ICJ Rep 136. 
70
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(30 Aug 2013), available at: http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/21/legality-intervention-syria-
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71
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Nicaragua Case, that the UNSC has primary (but not exclusive) authority on the use of 
force
73
 and further that there were, to date, no working examples of humanitarian 
intervention.
74
 The UK’s 1984 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Policy Document 
provides one of the clearest state articulations, concluding that ‘the best case that can be made 
in support of humanitarian intervention is that it cannot be said to unambiguously illegal’.75 
The FCO further highlighted the uncertainty surrounding existing state practice: 
 
[H]istory has shown that humanitarian ends are almost always mixed with other less 
laudable motives for intervening, and because often the “humanitarian” benefits of an 
intervention are either not claimed by the intervening state or are only put forward as an 
ex post facto justification of the intervention.
76
  
 
Some Charter violations could be linked to humanitarian crises (including India’s 
intervention in East Pakistan,
77
 Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia78 and Tanzania’s 
intervention in Uganda
79
). But despite the subsequent reliance on these examples by 
humanitarian intervention’s proponents, intervening states often recognised that they were 
acting illegally and rarely, if ever, employed humanitarian intervention as a justification.
80
 
General Assembly resolutions on the use of force, provide no support for humanitarian 
intervention and the vast majority of states continue to deny its existence.
 81
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75
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80
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The post-Cold War era saw an increasing debate over the doctrine.
82
 Whilst the US, 
UK and France did not invoke a stand-alone right to humanitarian intervention during the 
1991enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq, preferring to rely on a very broad interpretation 
of UNSC Resolution 688, the mixing of multiple basis for use of force would become more 
prominent. In particular, assertions of apparent UN authorisation would become a hallmark of 
US state practice.
83
 The basis for UK involvement was less than clear. Whereas one minister 
maintained that ‘[i]t is difficult and probably undesirable to lay down rules concerning a right 
to intervene’,84 the FCO Legal Adviser Anthony Aust subsequently informed 
parliamentarians that the no-fly-zone operations had been based not on UNSC Resolutions, 
but on humanitarian intervention.
85
 While admitting that this doctrine had no agreed 
definition, Aust gamely articulated his account of the necessary criteria for invoking the 
doctrine; first, the intervening state must consider there to be a compelling and urgent 
situation of extreme humanitarian distress, second, the affected state would have to be 
unwilling or unable to address such distress itself, third, a lack of practical alternatives to 
intervention and, fourth, any action by the intervening state should be limited to the time and 
scope necessitated by the crisis.
86
 Aust, however, subsequently asserted that most precedents 
for humanitarian intervention related to the protection of nationals abroad, an entirely 
separate issue under international law.
87
 In the early 1990s the UK position on humanitarian 
intervention was therefore characterised by confusion over the grounds for invoking the 
doctrine, compounded by reliance upon irrelevant precedents and scant consideration for how 
to evidence the basis for an intervention before domestic and international fora. 
Despite its doubtful legality, UK policy makers rely upon NATO’s 1999 operations in 
Kosovo as an example of state practice, even though the main legal argument invoked by 
both the US and UK was implied authorisation under UNSC Resolutions 1199 and 1203.
88
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Critically, Tony Blair’s administration did employ humanitarian intervention rhetoric, placing 
it within its new approach to international community,
89
 but this departure from previous 
FCO policy was not without historical revisionism. Following the Kosovo intervention Robin 
Cook asserted that since 1989 there is an ‘obligation to recognise that the international 
community does have a right to intervene where the sovereign state is permitting or practising 
genocide or gross humanitarian violations.
90
 He later developed this claim: 
 
First, any intervention is by definition a failure of prevention. Force should always be 
the last resort; second, the immediate responsibility for halting violence rests with the 
state in which it occurs; but, third, when faced with an overwhelming humanitarian 
catastrophe and a government that has demonstrated itself unwilling or unable to halt or 
prevent it, the international community should act; and finally any use of force in this 
context should be collective, proportionate, likely to achieve its objective, and carried 
out in accordance with international law.
91
 
 
Cook insisted that humanitarian intervention ought to be undertaken in line with the rule of 
law and alongside international partners. Critically, from the perspective of domestic debates, 
these qualifications point towards collective action rather than an individual state’s “right” to 
invoke humanitarian intervention.
92
 Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee was unmoved 
by these claims, asserting that the Kosovo operation ‘was contrary to the specific terms … of 
the UN Charter’93 and that ‘the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a tenuous basis in 
current international customary law ... [which] renders NATO action legally questionable’.94 
In response the Government welcomed the Committee’s acknowledgment of its efforts to 
obtain a clearer UNSC mandate, but high-handedly and curiously given the Executive’s later 
reliance on Parliamentarians, concluded ‘that disputes about international law are not ones 
that the Committee can resolve’.95 
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Kosovo provides a dubious basis for claims of a change in state practice. NATO was 
vague in its justifications, and certainly did not directly claim a right of humanitarian 
intervention, referring obliquely to the need to respond to humanitarian catastrophes.
96
 Most 
NATO states justified their intervention by reference “implied authorisation” under UNSC 
Resolutions. France, the Netherlands and Slovenia explicitly drew upon the UNSC’s 
acceptance under Chapter VII that events in Kosovo constituted a threat to international 
peace and security, albeit both China and Russia’s strongly opposed the suggestion that this 
provided a basis for NATO’s action.97 In the subsequent ICJ case, instigated by Serbia, there 
was scant reliance upon the supposed right of intervention.
98
 Dismissed at the provisional 
measures stage, only Belgium provided substantive legal grounds justifying intervention. 
These justifications centred upon implied authorisation, noting the UNSC’s rejection of 
Russia’s draft resolution condemning the intervention.99 Humanitarian intervention was 
raised only as an ancillary argument. India, Tanzania and Vietnam’s historical interventions 
were erroneously invoked as examples of relevant state practice.
100
 Serbia, by contrast, 
maintained that there was no right of intervention.
101
 
In spite of the UN Secretary General re-iterating the UNSC’s centrality within the 
international security system,
102
 the Kosovo intervention has been drawn upon as a model for 
circumventing the Charter. Although at the time Germany denied that Kosovo set a precedent 
for future action, the then German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, has subsequently claimed 
that NATO’s actions in Kosovo provided a precedent for Russia’s intervention during the 
Crimea Crisis; ‘[w]e sent our plan[e]s to Serbia and together with the rest of NATO they 
bombed a sovereign state without any UN security council backing’.103 Other NATO states 
also relied upon the failure of diplomatic efforts as a justification for military action.
104
 
Again, such claims would subsequently resurface in the context of proposed military action 
against the Assad regime in Syria in response to its use of chemical weapons in 2013, with 
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UNSC members which supported intervention characterising it as a last resort to prevent 
humanitarian catastrophe after the failure of all diplomatic efforts. China, by contrast, viewed 
events in Syria as an internal matter and emphasised Article 2.4 of the Charter.
105
 The 
development of responsibility to protect (R2P) provides a legal basis for intervention where 
states are unwilling or unable to protect their own citizens.
106
 R2P recognises that states owe 
a broad range of duties to protect their populations and after a failure to do so the 
international community may take collective action to protect populations within the 
Charter’s terms.107 This doctrine, which Kofi Annan envisaged as forestalling action outwith 
UN authorisation,
108
 undermines claims that a right of humanitarian intervention has emerged 
over the past two decades.
109
  
This section has demonstrated the UK’s increasing intermixing of legal justifications 
for uses of force in recent decades. Even when doctrines like humanitarian intervention have 
grabbed headlines, they have never stood alone as credible legal bases for action. In some 
supposed instances of legal humanitarian intervention Chapter VII UNSC Resolutions have 
fully authorised the use of force. In other cases they have been relied upon as providing 
implied authorisation or as establishing the factual scenario of a threat to international peace 
and security. Self-defence, either collective or individual, has in many respects become as 
controversial a basis for action as humanitarian intervention. The US and UK have asserted 
that Article 51 of the Charter grants states a very broad remit to decide when to invoke self-
defence, provided they report their action to the UNSC. As Christine Gray argues, this ‘lip-
service’ to the basis of self-defence risks dressing up uses of force in a ‘veneer of legality’.110 
Justifying uses of force based upon a concoction of grounds ‘boils with the danger of 
abuse’,111 particularly if such a case is constructed with the aim of swaying the opinion of 
domestic legislators. 
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The Internal Dimension: The UK Parliament’s Expanding Role in Use of Force 
Decisions  
 
The path towards the adoption of a constitutional convention whereby the House of 
Commons will be consulted on military action and thereby provide democratic oversight of 
the use of force begins in the nineteenth century, before the UK’s governance arrangements 
became truly democratic. A.V. Dicey’s contradictory interpretations of the UK war 
prerogative illustrate how difficult it would be for the Commons to develop an oversight role. 
Initially, Dicey explained that as a prerogative power, ‘it is not Parliament, but the Ministry, 
who … virtually decide all questions of peace or war’.112 This position aligned with William 
Blackstone’s account, whereby royal (executive) powers were deliberately excluded from 
Parliament’s purview ‘for the sake of unanimity, strength, and dispatch’,113 traits not always 
associated with parliamentary deliberation. Dicey was, however, writing in an era where 
representative politics were gaining importance. Even with his distrust of democracy, 
appreciated that he could not simply recite that executive discretion over conflict decisions 
remained unfettered. He therefore qualified his claims regarding the prerogative, asserting 
that these powers were ‘exercised by a Cabinet who are really servants, not of the Crown, but 
of a representative chamber which in its turn obeys the behests of the electors’.114 
In the early twentieth century “democratic” control of foreign policy often seemed far 
removed from political reality. When the opposition contemplated a censure motion 
regarding the conduct of the Boer War, its own MPs expressed a widely held view that 
Parliament was ‘a consultative body’ on military affairs; ‘[i]t can stimulate or it can paralyse 
action, but it cannot direct it’.115 Parliamentarians’ powerlessness was compounded by a lack 
of access to information. Ministers alone were able to draw upon the advice of professional 
diplomats, leading James Bryce to encourage MPs to grant the executive considerable 
latitude in foreign affairs: 
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[T]he foreign relations of modern states are so numerous and complex … that … even 
democratic countries like France and England are forced to leave foreign affairs to a far 
greater degree than home affairs to the discretion of the ministry of the day.
116
 
 
During his time at the Foreign Office Sir Edward Grey operated under the oversight not of 
Parliament, nor even of the Cabinet, but of ‘a small group of Ministers who received all ... 
important dispatches’.117 Grey stoked parliamentarians uncertainties over foreign affairs,118 
warning them of the perils of foreign policy conducted against a backdrop of ‘constant 
criticisms of individual Members of the House’.119 Answers to foreign policy questions were 
frequently opaque or were refused for reasons of security.
120
 Grey was not, however, averse 
to having his cake and eating it too, informing the French Ambassador that ‘he could promise 
nothing to any foreign power’ which would not receive Parliament’s ‘whole-hearted 
support’.121 Subjection to ‘[a] long course of the Grey treatment’122 saw some MPs bridle at 
their marginalisation and call for a dedicated Foreign Affairs Committee with access to 
diplomatic briefings
123
 to strengthen parliamentary expertise and thereby enhance scrutiny.
124
 
These calls long went unheeded.
125
  
Short of a censure motion,
126
 Parliament’s avenue for constraining the use of force lay 
in its control over government spending,
127
 given the extraordinary costs associated with 
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military campaigns.
128
 Radical Liberals did force votes over foreign-policy-related censure 
and supply motions in the years preceding the First World War, but these were roundly 
defeated.
129
 Amidst the fraught diplomacy of late-July 1914, as the Cabinet fractured over 
whether the UK should intervene in the event of a continental war,
130
 parliamentarians 
remained slow to express public dissent. Late that month, in a scheduled debate on UK naval 
spending, the Commons followed the entreaties of Charles Beresford, a leading critic of the 
UK’s foreign policy, that it would ‘be most unpatriotic under the circumstances abroad for 
anyone to make a drastic criticism showing up the weak points in our naval policy at the 
present moment’.131 For all of this weakness, however, when Grey came before Parliament on 
the eve of war, even though no vote was called, in a real sense he was seeking the authority 
of the Commons. He outlined the Government’s view of international relations and law, and 
put before MPs the circumstances in which he believed the UK would be drawn into conflict. 
A short debate ensued in which the leaders of the major parties assented.
132
 That a vote was 
not needed speaks to the inevitability of the outcome.
133
 To this day Grey’s speech remains 
dogged by controversy, with his critics arguing that Parliament committed the UK to war on 
the basis of a partial rendering of the events precipitating the conflict.
134
 
 Parliament’s response to the First World War set the tone for its subsequent 
engagement with the war prerogative. As a matter of law, there may have been no 
requirement for Parliament’s prior permission for the use of force,135 but prior to 1914 some 
actors were beginning to speak of a “constitutional” need to involve Parliament.136 After the 
war, such involvement would ordinarily be limited to a government’s ‘informal consultation 
with Parliament’,137 whereby ministers outlined official policy in an unamendable 
adjournment motion and invited parliamentary discussion, with the potential risk of censure 
being constrained by the party whip. By this process Parliament considered, often ex post 
facto, exercises of the war prerogative and gave tacit approval to twentieth-century military 
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interventions.
138
 Its involvement was intended to scrutinise and ultimately legitimate UK 
policy, to inform the general public and also to prevent the accumulation of societal tensions 
by airing different viewpoints on the decision to use force.
139
 Often these arrangements meant 
that the Commons would find itself presented with a “done deal” by ministers;140 
circumstances it would be internationally humiliating for MPs to question the Government’s 
policy.
141
 Even as the mystique surrounding the Foreign Office waned in the aftermath of the 
First World War,
142
 ministers would continue to provide deliberately vague answers to 
parliamentary questions regarding military operations.
143
 Into the Charter era the exigencies 
of the Cold War thwarted any development of Parliament’s oversight of war powers. Against 
the backdrop of potential nuclear war, the Ministry of Defence protocol on military 
deployments warned that ‘almost every military move or alert is a subject of public concern 
and comment’.144 When no one could tell whether a proxy war might ignite a wider conflict 
the watchwords became executive freedom, and ‘any argument about whether Parliament 
should insist on giving prior approval to a war becomes farcical’.145 Even in the lead up to the 
2003 Iraq War debate the Attorney General maintained that it would ‘be lawful and 
constitutional for the Government, in exercising the Royal Prerogative … to engage United 
Kingdom forces in military action without the prior approval of Parliament’.146 The most 
extensive claim that could be made of this history of “democratic oversight” within the UK is 
consequently subject to extensive caveats; ‘there has not been a significant armed conflict 
overseas since the beginning of the 20th century in which the United Kingdom has been 
involved where, in one way or another, at the time of decision or in retrospect, this House has 
not indicated whether, and in what way, it has consented to the Executive decision taken’.147 
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If the Cold War ossified the form of Parliament’s involvement in use-of-force 
decisions, the Charter’s provisions did at least change the focus of its scrutiny.148 Although, 
in the Charter ratification debate, some MPs noted Parliament’s limited role in foreign 
affairs,
149
 through the second half of the twentieth century parliamentarians paid increasing 
attention to UNSC activity. Other than instances such as the Falkland’s War, where the UK’s 
actions were explained by reference to self defence,
150
 the bright-line nature of the Charter’s 
restrictions meant that, from the Korean War onwards,
151
 it became standard practice for 
ministers to refer to authorising UNSC Resolutions in motions seeking parliamentary support 
for military interventions. The effect of the lack of such a Resolution is exemplified by the 
heated debates over the 1956 Suez Crisis
152
 and the 2003 Iraq War.
153
 But even in the latter 
context, the motion before Parliament sought to clothe the UK’s use of force on the pretext of 
destroying Iraq’s supposed stockpiles of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the UNSC’s 
authority; ‘the opinion of the Attorney General that, … Iraq being at the time of Resolution 
1441 and continuing to be in material breach, the authority to use force under Resolution 678 
has revived and so continues today’.154 Parliament supported this motion by 412 votes to 149. 
 The Iraq War debate and vote were, at the time, presented as major concessions by the 
Blair Government. Hitherto, the control of foreign affairs under the Royal Prerogative and 
arguments that any substantive parliamentary dissent towards UK policy ‘might be exploited 
by the adversary as evidence of division and hence weakness’155 had enabled ministers to 
avoid such set-piece debates and votes. The Blair Government’s change of approach from its 
practice at the outset of the interventions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, was not 
without its benefits for the administration. The UK Government enjoys marked advantages in 
the Commons as opposed to the UNSC in its efforts to legitimate the use of force. Opposition 
to military action which a Government has made the case for being in the national interest 
can be cast as unpatriotic in time of crisis. Fear of this label had so affected the Labour Party 
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at the time of its opposition to the Suez intervention that, even after its success in the 1964 
General Election, it refused to institute an inquiry into the Crisis.
156
 Despite the concerns he 
expressed before Parliament over the Iraq War, Iain Duncan Smith nonetheless brought the 
bulk of Conservative MPs to support the action on the basis that ‘when the Government do 
the right thing by the British people, they deserve the support of the House’.157 Party loyalty 
can also be exploited to keep the Government’s own backbench MPs in line with its position 
on military force,
158
 which Tony Blair played up to by suggesting that he would resign if 
defeated.
159
 Moreover, notwithstanding the inherent difficulty with isolating legal issues from 
the wider context of international relations,
160
 the nature of Commons debate precludes 
authoritative legal or security assessment, leaving parliamentarians beholden to summaries of 
the advice enjoyed by the Executive. In the context of the Iraq War both the intelligence basis 
for war
161
 and the summary of the Attorney General’s legal advice provided to Parliament 
were seriously deficient.
162
 In the final assessment a parliamentary authorisation of a use of 
force remains a political assessment drawing upon national interest and moral considerations 
as well as issues of lawfulness. MPs might therefore accept (as some arguably did in the 
context of Iraq) an action as legitimate notwithstanding a breach of international law.
163
 
Exploiting these advantages, the Blair Government harnessed the legitimating force of 
Parliament’s vote on the use of force to draw attention away from the lack of a clear basis for 
military action under international law. 
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Combining the Internal and External Approaches  
 
The importance of the 2003 Iraq War to the UK’s overarching approach to the use of force 
can nonetheless be overstated. This conflict did not witness the creation of a constitutional 
convention requiring that the House of Commons be consulted over future uses of force. 
When the courts thereafter heard challenges to the legality of the invasion no judges spoke of 
adjusting their approaches in light of a developing convention. At best, the Gentle
164
 
jurisprudence pointed to the hazy nature of democratic oversight of UK military action, as 
seen in Lord Hope’s assertion that the lawfulness of the invasion was ‘a matter for … which 
ministers are answerable to Parliament and, ultimately, to the electorate’.165 On becoming 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown pledged enhanced parliamentary oversight of the use of 
force,
166
 and his Government supported claims that the Iraq vote set a precedent regarding the 
Commons approval of military action,
167
 but did not have cause to act upon this pledge. The 
Iraq War vote could well have been an aberration, had it not been for the chastening impact 
of the subsequent ‘ill-fated occupation of the country’168 and David Cameron’s consequent 
eagerness to distance his administrations’ repeated uses of force from the Blair Government’s 
practice. Cameron’s administrations have intertwined the enhancement of Parliament’s role 
in approving military actions (the internal shift in UK use-of-force processes) with the 
already-established trend of advancing novel grounds for action in international law (the 
external aspect of how the UK approaches the use of force). The UK’s responses to the 
collapse of the Libya, the Syrian Civil War and the rise of ISIS have involved the official 
invocation of almost every conceivable legal justification for the use of force before the 
Westminster Parliament. Although each successive vote has hardened the constitutional 
convention that Parliament will be consulted on uses of force, little has been done to 
strengthen the Parliament’s capacity to meaningfully scrutinise proposals for military action. 
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(i) 2011 Debate: Use of Force against Qaddafi’s Regime in Libya 
 
Following the 2010 general election the Coalition Government accepted the constitutional 
force behind Parliament’s claims to authority over the 2011 intervention in Libya. As Sir 
George Young, informed the House of Commons: 
 
A convention has developed in the House that before troops are committed, the House 
should have an opportunity to debate the matter. We propose to observe that convention 
except when there is an emergency and such action would not be appropriate. As with 
the Iraq war and other events, we propose to give the House the opportunity to debate 
the matter before troops are committed.
169
 
 
The Government’s acceptance that it was, outside exceptional circumstances, bound to give 
the Commons a consultative vote on military action was in part a function of its nature as a 
coalition, and in part a conscious effort by David Cameron to differentiate his approach to 
conflict from Tony Blair’s reluctant acceptance of a vote on the 2003 Iraq War.170 According 
to Joseph, ministers appreciated that ‘[t]he decision to deploy the armed forces is too 
important … to leave to the Prime Minister and an inner cabal of government ministers’.171 
Notwithstanding these drivers, the shift appeared to radically enhance Parliament’s role 
regarding the war prerogative. Few US Presidents, by comparison, would contemplate 
‘voluntarily surrender[ing] the discretion that their institutional position provides’.172  
This change could alternately indicate the Coalition Government’s appreciation that 
trumpeting Parliament’s involvement can enhance the legitimacy of conflict decisions. The 
Young Convention was articulated after the UNSC’s unanimous adoption, under Chapter VII, 
of Resolution 1970 which explicitly cited R2P in demanding ‘an immediate end to the 
violence’ in Libya.173 Just over two weeks later it followed up on this demand, authorising: 
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Member States ... acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, 
and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures 
… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack …, while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory …174  
 
This Resolution ‘represents the first mandate by the Security Council for a military 
intervention based on the responsibility to protect against the wishes of a functioning 
government’.175 The resolution represents a clear, and quite prescriptive, Security Council 
mandate. The resolution specifically excluded a ground campaign while requiring a no-fly 
zone as well as further diplomatic efforts and military action that protected civilian 
populations. Indeed, in the Commons debate on the intervention in Libya, Sir Menzies 
Campbell confidently asserted that UK action was ‘on much stronger ground’ than previous 
interventions, including Kosovo, because rather than being predicated on the humanitarian 
intervention doctrine, ‘the Security Council has said expressly … that “all necessary 
measures” may be taken’.176 
Potentially troubling, in light of Sir George Young’s pledge, was that the UK’s 
military intervention in Libya that began over the course of the weekend prior to the 
Commons debate and consultative vote.
177
 Although Parliament, as so often in the past, was 
presented with a fait accompli, MPs overwhelmingly backed the intervention.
178
 The 
Government was generally perceived to have acted properly, given the political consensus, 
clear basis for action in international law and the caveat within the Young Convention 
allowing it to act in advance of Commons’ authorisation when responding to an emergency 
situation. Several MPs expressly accepted that the assault on Bengazi by Colonel Qaddafi’s 
forces would have claimed more civilian lives had intervention been delayed.
179
 Despite the 
apparent significance of the Young Convention’s emergence, Nigel White has noted that 
even in the context of the 2011 intervention, in which the legal basis for action was 
uncontroversial, ministers still refused to provide ‘the full legal advice necessary for 
Parliament to make informed decisions’.180 Parliament’s access to little more than 
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fragmentary legal advice would become a re-occurring feature of subsequent intervention 
debates. Arguably, the Young Convention’s effect was to stimulate Parliament’s formal role 
without strengthening the substantive effect of its scrutiny. 
 
(ii) 2013 Debate: Use of Force against the Assad Regime in Syria 
 
By the summer of 2013, the Syrian Civil War had spawned a humanitarian crisis that spilled 
into Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. In August, the use of chemical weapons near 
Damascus dramatically heightened the possibility of direct intervention by outside powers. 
The UNSC condemned the attack, albeit without apportioning blame.
181
 Although R2P 
appeared to fit such circumstances, Russia’s continued support of the Assad Regime 
prevented the UNSC from authorising such action. The UK Government therefore sought 
Parliament’s support for military action against Assad’s forces not as an adjunct to UNSC 
authorisation, but in lieu of any operative resolution.
182
  
In contrast to the Libya intervention the 2013 Syria debate took place before force 
was employed.
183
 This was no accident, for before Parliament’s summer recess MPs 
concerned with the Government’s intentions had passed a motion requiring that ‘no lethal 
support’ would be provided against President Assad’s forces ‘without the explicit prior 
consent of Parliament’.184 Despite the Government’s ability to plausibly claim that the 
chemical weapons attack constituted an emergency requiring prompt response, as it had in 
Libya, David Cameron recalled Parliament. This development, and the Government’s 
adherence to the outcome of the vote, indicate that ministers regarded themselves as obliged 
to follow the constitutional convention that they had invoked two years earlier.
185
 For the 
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, these actions meant that outside exceptional 
emergency circumstances Parliament must express its opinion on a use of force prior to the 
UK’s involvement.186 Carsten Stahn has therefore argued that the ‘greater involvement of 
parliamentary control over executive action may be one of the “gains” of the Syrian crises.187 
When Parliament authorises military force, its consideration of action’s legality is, however, 
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bound together with deliberation upon an action’s morality and whether ‘it is a politically or 
militarily sensible operation’.188 The latter facets of the decision have come to make the UK 
Parliament one of the decision-making fora at which a proposed use of force can be rejected, 
thereby bringing decision-making closer to the influence of domestic constituent actors (UK 
citizens). At issue, however, is whether such activity can displace the UNSC’s role. 
In his legal advice, published in summary form to bolster the Government’s case for 
action, the Attorney General Dominic Grieve asserted that ‘[i]f action in the Security Council 
is blocked, the UK would still be permitted under international law to take exceptional 
measures in order to alleviate the scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in 
Syria’.189 His advice had two limbs. The first was that use of force by the UK is not 
necessarily predicated upon UNSC authorisation and the second explained the circumstances 
which would trigger the UK’s supposed right to intervene by force in another state for 
humanitarian purposes.
190
 The first limb was predicated upon parliamentary affirmation 
supplying the necessary democratic authority for an action, thereby displacing the need for 
UNSC input.
191
 The implication of the advice is that such domestic activity can and should 
impact upon an action’s international legality.192 From being mooted as a potential avenue by 
which to provide ‘extra democratic legitimacy to military action’ after the Kosovo 
intervention,
193
 the 2013 Syria crisis saw ministers treat Parliament as the only forum 
necessary for legitimating UK humanitarian intervention. The pace of this change should give 
reason for pause. The Government’s Syria motion pushed Parliament to the fore because of 
the UNSC’s failure ‘over the last two years to take united action in response to the Syrian 
crisis’.194 That this flattery failed to overcome MPs’ concerns over intervention should not 
obscure the Government’s concerted effort to marginalise UN institutions.  
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Many MPs showed some conception of international law’s requirements regarding the 
use of force, with some affirming the importance of the UN.
195
 Some, however, readily 
accepted that interventions can be justified on the basis of a post-Charter paradigm, swathed 
in the Attorney General’s reassuring legalese: 
 
I am, by instinct and nature, a humanitarian interventionist. I support the responsibility 
to protect. ... I believe that there are sometimes circumstances where it is right to take 
action without a United Nations Security Council resolution.
196
 
 
Such statements, eliding the distinct concepts of humanitarian intervention and R2P,
197
 
highlight the risks inherent in the move towards parliamentary authorisation. The 
Government endeavoured to win parliamentarians over to humanitarian intervention by 
playing upon frustrations with UN processes which were, after all, designed to stymie 
opportunities for a state or group of states to intervene in the affairs of another by force.  
Having set out the UK Government’s position that the UNSC is, in certain cases, 
dispensable, Dominic Grieve’s advice proceeds to lay down a test for the legal use of force in 
response to an ‘overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe’.198 He advanced three prerequisites 
for invoking humanitarian intervention:  
 
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as 
a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and 
urgent relief; 
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of 
force if lives are to be saved; and 
(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief 
of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim (i.e. 
the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose).
199
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These grounds for intervention pay little attention to the relevant international law.
200
 
Couched in dense legalese, the test purportedly provides a pragmatic formula for 
interventions, but is unconvincing regarding the necessary evidence-base. The test relies on 
the UK Government’s conclusion that the “international community” accepts that a 
humanitarian crisis is ongoing and foists the factual assessment upon domestic legislators 
(regardless of their capacity perform this task).
201
 Philippe Sands questions Parliament’s 
ability to conduct such an analysis in the context of the 2013 debate, especially when ‘the 
assertions by the Prime Minister did not appear to be an accurate summary or account of the 
legal advice received, and in this way had the effect of misleading Parliament’.202 The notion 
of “general acceptance” within the international community of circumstances requiring 
urgent action attempts to discount the opposition of Russia and China to intervention in the 
UNSC. As such, the only states that matter under this test are liberal-democratic states which 
accept the possibility of lawful humanitarian intervention. Russell Buchan has suggested that 
an operative international community might indeed be confined in this way
203
 and that some 
states’ opposition to humanitarian intervention could therefore be ‘dismissed as 
illegitimate’.204 The 2013 chemical weapons crisis highlighted the weaknesses in this 
proposition. Russia maintained that good-faith negotiations were capable of resolving the 
specific chemical weapons crisis and was able to use its leverage with the Assad regime to 
respond to the US and UK position that Syria could address their concerns by verifiable 
destruction of all such weapons.
205
 The subsequent UNSC activity and destruction of Syrian 
chemical weapons removed this issue as a basis for urgent action.
206
 
US and UK assertions of a right of humanitarian intervention have been described by 
Harold Koh as an ‘evolution’ within international law.207 Loose talk of evolution, however, 
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avoids discussion of the necessary elements for the alteration of customary international law; 
state practice and opinio juris. Koh is effectively presenting these states’ internal discussions 
as sufficient to constitute state practice. Although official legal advice can evidence state 
practice,
208
 other states would not ordinarily comment upon it, as they would with state 
actions, meaning that it should be treated with considerable caution.
209
 Koh’s claims are 
supported by Sir Daniel Bethlehem, former FCO Legal Adviser, who asserted that strict 
application of Article 2.4’s prohibition on aggressive war would be ‘simplistic’, and argued 
that the Commons’ rejection of intervention did not challenge the lawfulness of humanitarian 
intervention as the debate had focused on the ‘wisdom of intervention, not on its legality’.210 
The latter claim is dubious in light of the specific focus on questions of legality by many of 
the contributions to the debate, but the former assertion points towards Bethlehem’s 
acceptance that, despite the Charter’s clear terms, domestic assemblies’ decisions can affect 
the legality of military force under international law.  
In empowering Parliament, David Cameron’s administrations have been less 
concerned with enhancing oversight of the war prerogative, than with shifting the key 
governance point at which a conflict is legitimated away from the Charter’s mechanisms. 
This shift allows ministers to take advantage of the factors which historically stymied 
effective Commons’ oversight of foreign affairs, including their control of information, their 
ability to cast the issue in terms of national interest and their command of party loyalty. 
Whilst going to Parliament does not guarantee such success, as Cameron might have 
imagined it would, this approach does improve a government’s chances of legitimating an 
action by comparison to the UNSC route. When Parliament rejected the motion to authorise 
the use of force
211
 the Prime Minister accepted that the Government could not use the 
prerogative to involve the UK military in the Syrian conflict against Parliament’s wishes.212 
After this chastening experience, however, ministers have been able to make even more 
persuasive claims as to the weight of Parliament’s input.   
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(iii) 2014 Debate: Use of Force against ISIS in Iraq 
 
In 2014 the conflict in Syria spilled into neighbouring Iraq as ISIS suddenly seized a swathe 
of territory in both countries. Unable to contain ISIS, and with Baghdad itself under threat, 
the Iraqi Government made a ‘specific request’ for air strikes by allied countries to support its 
efforts at self defence.
213
 Intervention by invitation is anticipated by the Charter.
214
 The UK 
could therefore respond to the Iraqi Government request for support without drawing upon 
any controversial legal basis for action and Parliamentary support for action against ISIS in 
Iraq was overwhelming.
215
 Throughout the debate, however, the possibility of wider 
intervention was advanced, but held in check by the shadow of the Commons’ rejection of 
intervention in Syria a year earlier.  
 Even before the UK debate other states, led by the US, had responded to the Iraqi 
Government’s request and were already engaging ISIS targets in Syria. The UNSC had 
recognised ISIS as part of the broad threat terrorism posed to international peace and 
security,
216
 and mandated, under Chapter VII, that states take action to prevent foreign 
fighters entering Syria, but it had not authorised the use of force against the group. Resolution 
2178 therefore provided no basis for extending operations against ISIS targets within Syria 
and President Bashar al-Assad’s regime had not given authority for Coalition aircraft to 
operate within its airspace. The US Government therefore justified its airstrikes in Syria 
through a combination of Article 51, on the basis of its engagement in collective self defence 
of Iraq, and the claim that the Syrian Government was ‘unwilling or unable’ to deal with the 
threat ISIS posed to Iraq.
217
 Although the US had previously employed the unwilling-or-
unable doctrine to justify drone strikes and special operations in Pakistan and Somalia, few 
states endorse this approach. Many of the states involved in the Coalition expressed 
reservations with this legal basis for action in Syria,
218
 although Canada in April 2015, 
Australia in September, and France in October, would subsequently extend their air 
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campaigns into Syria.
219
 Turkey began airstrikes against ISIS and the PKK in Syria in July 
2015, citing its own self-defence concerns.
220
 
Despite the published summary of the UK Government’s legal guidance on 
intervention being predicated upon the Iraqi Government’s consent, and therefore disclosing 
no basis for the legality of using force against ISIS in Syria,
221
 David Cameron explicitly told 
MPs that he saw no barrier in international law to extending the UK’s support for the Iraqi 
Government into Syria.
222
 The Leader of the Opposition, Ed Miliband accepted that there was 
‘a strong argument about the legal base for action in Syria under article 51 [UN Charter]’.223 
Nonetheless, the Government’s decision to seek authority for airstrikes in Iraq alone 
demonstrated the impact of the 2013 debate. Although the Government did display a sudden 
aversion to intervention in the absence of clear legal grounds, David Cameron still set out 
some circumstances in which the UK might use force in Syria, even without explicit 
Commons’ authorisation:  
 
If there was the need to take urgent action to prevent, for instance, the massacre of a 
minority community or a Christian community, and Britain could act to prevent that 
humanitarian catastrophe – if I believed we could effectively act and do that – I am 
saying I would order that and come straight to the House and explain afterwards.
224
 
 
The Prime Minister did not explain the legal basis for such an intervention beyond the vague 
ned for ‘urgent action’ in the context of ‘humanitarian catastrophe’. The former Attorney 
General, however, maintained that the extension to UK operations against ISIS into Syria 
would be both legal and legitimate notwithstanding the deadlock in the UNSC: 
 
There is no doubt that [the UNSC] has an important role to play in issues concerning 
humanitarian necessity, but the Government will at least have to consider whether any 
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application, if it were to come, to the UN for such a resolution has any prospect of 
success. The ability to intervene, I have no doubt, exists, even if no such resolution is 
present.
225
 
 
Dominic Grieve may have been expanding upon a legal position he had set out a year earlier 
regarding intervention in Syria, but he was joined by parliamentarians who eagerly expressed 
their opinion that extending the intervention into Syria would be legal on humanitarian 
intervention grounds.
226
 The impact of the successive UK Governments’ efforts to build up 
Parliaments’ role and marginalise the UNSC was therefore bearing fruit in terms of 
parliamentary support, even if such an intervention was in this instance theoretical.  
 As ISIS continued to gain territory and adherents in spite of the Coalition airstrikes 
the UK Government would employ the “urgent action” exception within the Young 
Convention not in the context of a humanitarian response, but on the basis of defending 
against threats to ‘a critical British national interest’.227 In early September David Cameron 
informed Parliament that the UK had indeed used force in Syria, through a drone strike which 
killed three ISIS members near Raqqa. The Prime Minister characterised the strike as an 
emergency response to the threat posed by Reyaad Khan, a UK citizen fighting with ISIS, 
without which ‘we had no way of preventing his planned attacks on our country.’228 The 
Prime Minister’s argument that the drone strike was an imminent necessity to prevent an 
attack against the UK appears to be an effort to fit the action within Article 51 of the Charter. 
Indeed this was the basis on which the UK informed the UNSC of its action though notably 
these were not the terms by which Parliament was informed.
229
 Whether a drone strike can be 
justified under Article 51 involves not simply a claim as to the extent of this provision of the 
Charter, but requires the UK to establish the legal and factual basis for this claim. Although 
the Attorney General maintained that such action is possible in response to a planned armed 
attack by a terrorist group,
230
 the limits of self-defence against a terrorist group under of 
international law are contested and difficult to fulfil,
231
 and parliamentary oversight of such 
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claims is all but impossible when MPs are not given access even to a document summarising 
his legal advice. The Government did not, moreover, provide Parliament with factual 
evidence indicating the imminence of Khan’s threat. In the absence of such evidence the UK 
could well be characterised as employing the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive self defence.
232
 In 
this strike the Government was trying to gain advantages from all potentially-applicable legal 
paradigms. It wanted to present the incident as a use of force covered by Article 51 to attempt 
to avoid the application of international human rights law, but also sought to persuade 
Parliament that it was a one-off strike not warranting further scrutiny by MPs. 
 
(iv) 2015 Debate: Use of Force against ISIS in Syria  
 
Throughout 2015 UK Government maintained that its intention was to extend general 
military action against ISIS into Syria, and not simply to respond to specific threats to UK 
interests, but that it needed ‘parliamentary authority’ to do so.233 Parliament’s refusal to 
authorise military force against Assad in 2013 ‘loomed large’ over official policy,234 and 
ministers maintained that ‘we will not bring a motion to the House on which there is not 
some consensus’.235 There is no doubt that the Government felt bound by the Young 
Convention, in spite of persistent siren voices that it did not amount to a legal constraint upon 
action.
236
 For all the attention paid to Parliament, however, the UK Government downplayed 
the significance of the UNSC. The Defence Secretary styled the UK’s failure to undertake 
airstrikes in Syria as ‘morally indefensible’ alluding to the need to defend UK interests 
against ISIS.
237
 Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee remained unconvinced, maintaining 
that UNSC authorisation was ‘desirable for more than simply legal reasons’.238 
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The downing of Metrojet Flight 9268 in October 2015, claimed by ISIS as retaliation 
for Russia’s airstrikes in support of the Assad regime,239 and the terrorist attacks on Paris two 
weeks later, which ISIS claimed were a response to French airstrikes in Iraq and Syria,
240
 
changed the terms of the debate on intervention. As the attribution of these attacks to ISIS 
was confirmed, the UK Government stepped up its claims that self defence provided a legal 
basis for extending the UK’s strikes against ISIS into Syria: 
 
Of course, it is always preferable in these circumstances to have the full backing of the 
UN Security Council, but what matters most of all is that any action we would take 
would be both legal and help protect our country and our people right here. As I said 
yesterday, we cannot outsource to a Russian veto the decisions we need to keep our 
country safe.
241
  
 
The French Government treated the mass-casualty attacks as an act of war and immediately 
invoked the European Union’s (EU) mutual assistance provision in response to an armed 
attack.
242
 Rather than side-lining the UNSC, however, the French also reworked a Russian 
draft resolution into UNSC Resolution 2249.
243
 Agreed unanimously, this Resolution 
broadens the scope of for military action against ISIS. The decision to not invoke Chapter 
VII, whilst nonetheless making a factual assertion as to the existence of a threat to 
international peace and security, is a singular development which means that the Resolution 
could be described as a half-way house towards the authorisation of force. Instead of 
explicitly authorising force, the Resolution recognises that ISIS constitutes an ongoing threat 
to peace and security that is not confined to Iraq and Syria and calls upon states to invoke 
self-defence, collectively and individually. In doing so, the UNSC is allowing states to claim 
self-defence under Article 51 when undertaking operations against ISIS targets in Iraq and 
Syria without having to establish a factual scenario warranting such a response. Resolution 
2249 therefore cuts through the legal dispute over whether a non-state group can be 
responsible for an armed attack.
244
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 Even with Resolution 2249 in place, the UK Government spent nearly two weeks 
reinforcing its support within Parliament. First, under the auspices of replying to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, the Prime Minister set out his case for action, ‘founded on the right of 
self-defence as recognised in article 51 of the United Nations [C]harter’,245 on the basis that 
ISIS activity ‘has reached the level of an “armed attack”, such that force may lawfully be 
used in self-defence to prevent further atrocities being committed’.246 Resolution 2249 merely 
‘underscored’ this basis for action.247 Having ascertained reaction in the House and the 
country to this opening gambit, and confident that a comfortable Commons majority in 
favour of military action was in hand, the Prime Minister announced a day long debate and 
vote.
248
 In the course of this debate many MPs who had wavered over military action in the 
preceding months noted the impact of both the changed security situation and the ‘clear and 
unambiguous’249 UNSC 2249 in persuading them to back the Government’s motion. Former 
Home Secretary Alan Johnson noted that whereas the House had been inhibited from 
supporting action against ISIS outside Iraq ‘by the absence of a specific UN resolution’, no 
such impediment remained.
250
 Although the Leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, 
maintained that Resolution 2249 did not give ‘unambiguous authorisation’251 as it was not 
adopted under Chapter VII, other opponents of action (on non-legal grounds) adopted the 
more sophisticated legal argument that although ‘it does not authorise force … it implies a 
reference to self-defence, which would be a lawful basis for action’.252 Both this and the 
Government’s position underplay the significance of Resolution 2249 to the legality of UK 
intervention on self defence grounds. The Resolution means that states do not have to 
establish that they are responding to an armed attack as the UNSC accepts that this basis is 
fulfilled, a fact interwoven into any subsequent Article 51 claim.  
In setting out the Government’s motion, David Cameron was at pains to emphasise 
his responsiveness to MPs’ concerns,253 but some of the established shortcomings of 
Commons authorisation once again came to the fore. On the military grounds for 
intervention, despite David Cameron’s insistence that the ISIS ‘threat is very real’,254 he 
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provided little detail of the links between ISIS and the recent terror plots against the UK 
which he recounted. Even if many parliamentarians accepted the threat posed by ISIS as a 
given in light of its international terrorist attacks, and the support for the Prime Minister’s 
analysis in Resolution 2249, MPs struggled to get much detail regarding the ground forces 
that the Government regarded as vital to the success of operations against ISIS. David 
Cameron’s assertion that as many as 70,000 fighters could be available to seize territory 
currently held by ISIS was widely disputed as ‘absurd’,255 but the Government continued to 
deflect criticism on the basis that this constituted the independent analysis of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee.
256
 The Prime Minister’s insistence in the Commons’ Chamber that a 
vote either way on this issue was ‘honourable’257 could not disguise the efforts by 
Government whips to bring potential Conservative dissenters into line. The allegation that he 
had warned Conservative backbenchers off siding with ‘a bunch of terrorist sympathisers’258 
indicates the degree to which jingoism and party loyalty can be used by the executive to 
garner support for military action. No summary of the Attorney General’s legal advice was 
published in advance of the Commons vote, even though Jeremy Wright informed the 
Commons that ‘the legal basis for action … is not dependent on the presence of a Security 
Council resolution’.259 For all of the discussion of Resolution 2249 in the debate, the motion 
for airstrikes merely welcomed the Resolution and drew instead upon the UN Charter as 
providing a ‘clear legal basis to defend the UK and our allies’.260 Few MPs displayed an 
appreciation for this distinction, with many instead wrapping themselves in the language of 
Resolution 2249. Some explicitly referenced the House of Commons’ Library Briefing 
Paper
261
 that had explained the relationship between the UNSC Resolution and Article 51.
262
 
Useful as this resource undoubtedly proved, like MPs the few legally-trained Library staff 
had no access to the Government’s detailed legal advice and so could not analyse its 
reasoning.
263
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Parliament’s response demonstrates a surprising waypoint in the past two decades of 
its developing role in authorising the use of force. MPs showed themselves to be resistant to 
attempts to put Parliament in the place of international legal processes on the use of force. 
The UNSC’s intervention changed the dynamic at Westminster, supplying ‘the reason for 
urgency and the reason why we have to take action’.264 The UK Government’s desire to 
contribute to collective security by stepping up operations against ISIS looked unlikely, of 
itself, to sway MPs towards accepting such action until Resolution 2249 recognised the threat 
ISIS posed to international peace and security and affirmed that self defence provided a legal 
basis for action. But the UK Government’s refusal to publish even a summary of legal advice, 
and the evident shortcomings in the information Parliament received on the security situation 
in Syria point to risks remaining in Parliament’s new role. The November 2015 debate 
evidences many MPs’ heighted awareness of international law’s precepts after a decade of 
UK interventions in the Middle East and the Maghreb. The consequences of those 
interventions have also led to heightened scrutiny of the UK Government’s security claims. 
When the afterglow of these actions fade, the systemic weaknesses in parliamentary 
authorisation may return to limit this constraint on the war prerogative. Moreover, future UK 
Government ministers looking back at the precedent of the 2015 debate will likely emphasise 
that the action was justified on the basis of self defence. Once again, UK Government has 
protected its capacity for future uses of force without UNSC authorisation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
At a time when the UNSC faces sustained criticism as a result of its perceived failure to 
address threats to international peace and security successive UK Governments have 
cultivated approaches to the use of force which further marginalise its role. First, they have 
set out to justify military actions on a myriad of grounds, including legally dubious doctrines 
such as humanitarian intervention and pre-emptive self defence. These doctrines, invoked on 
the basis of precedents which are either not applicable to the claims made or which are highly 
disputed, seek to loosen the Charter’s strictures upon the use of force. Second, having used 
these grounds to shift the focus of use-of-force decision-making away from the UNSC, the 
UK Government has accepted a new constitutional convention enhancing Parliament’s role in 
this process. Although this shift in practice might appear to enhance domestic oversight of the 
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war prerogative there is reason to suspect that ministers were not unduly troubled by the 
prospect of “democratic oversight”. Underpinning Commons’ authorisation on the UK 
Government’s stated grounds is the seductive idea that a domestic legislature, through its 
deliberative character and democratic nature, can provide a better basis for checking use-of-
force proposals than the UN’s supposedly outmoded institutional arrangements. 
David Cameron’s administrations have sought to substitute the flexibility of an appeal 
to MPs for the rigidity of UNSC processes. As we have shown, for all that Cameron’s 
ministers have made loud play of their respect for Parliament to draw legitimacy from its 
consultative votes, the Young Convention has not enhanced the tools at Parliament’s disposal 
for assessing whether a use of force is legal and in the UK’s national interest. Terse accounts 
of the legal grounds have often had to be extracted from the Prime Minister’s statements 
proposing an intervention. Without a dedicated legal service MPs can struggle to make sense 
of the myriad of legal justifications for military action advanced since the 2011 Libya 
intervention. Moreover, for security reasons, the UK Government has refused to share with 
Parliament the factual information necessary for MPs to assess whether grounds such as self-
defence can indeed be invoked. Parliament has, nonetheless, been far from toothless. The 
Commons defeat on intervention against the Assad regime in Syria in 2013 was a severe 
reverse for UK foreign policy. A secure Commons’ majority in favour of action against ISIS 
in Syria in 2015 only coalesced following the passing of UNSC Resolution 2249. 
Notwithstanding such setbacks, the Government’s calculation remains in certain 
circumstances it will be more likely to succeed in the Commons than in the UNSC.  
We do not claim that domestic assemblies ought not to be involved in use of force 
decisions, and indeed welcome meaningful additional scrutiny of proposed military action. 
But a domestic assembly’s vote can have no significance in international law or other states 
will  increasingly draw upon the authority of their own domestic assemblies in use of force 
decisions, even when the character of such assemblies are neither truly deliberative nor 
democratically-elected. States subject to the proposed use of force, which have a voice within 
international institutions, are excluded from domestic decision-making processes. Democratic 
domestic assemblies should therefore be wary of becoming the predominant governance 
point for authorising military force, on the principled basis that doing so would undermine 
UN institutions and on the pragmatic basis that legislators are ill-equipped to assess whether a 
use of force is legitimate under the tests currently in circulation. Relying upon domestic 
assemblies to provide the sole necessary authorisation point for certain uses of force might 
appear to offer a means to unblock international institutional processes. This course, 
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however, turns away from international constraints upon the use of force and opens the door 
to new forms of unilateralism. 
